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1 Introduction
Regulators often have to set environmental policy without being completely informed
about the costs of new technology. The range of technologies that can be adopted in
reaction to environmental (e.g. climate change) policy, might di¤er signicantly, ranging
from fuel substitution, to solar, wind or nuclear energy, up to carbon capture and storage
(Krysiak, 2008). We can therefore expect that, at least for the less mature technologies,
the regulator is able to only imperfectly observe their features and, therefore, to infer how
good regulated rms are in using them. As Nentjes et al. (2007) point out, when environ-
mental policy is made stricter (e.g. through stricter environmental standards) regulators
might indeed face uncertainty concerning the capability of a regulated industry to develop
and install the needed technology. Existing and past environmental policy choices have
in several cases been based on imperfect anticipations of the related costs and impacts,
most notably so when setting feed-in tari¤s (FITs) for renewable energy generation.1 On
the basis of these considerations, we can expect the regulators informational burden re-
lated to new technology deployment to be signicant. We can also expect that the rms
themselves know more about the cost of new technologies than the regulator.
We then focus on the incentives of an industry with a continuum of small rms to invest
in a cleaner technology under two environmental policy instruments: tradable emission
permits and emission taxation. We are thus comparing price and quantity instruments
under uncertainty about abatement costs (that we model à la Weitzman, 1974) in a model
of technology adoption and policy timing. Environmental policy is set either before the
rms invest (commitment) or after (time consistency). We assume asymmetric informa-
tion, in that the rmsabatement costs with the new technology are either high or low.
In addition to this "aggregate" informational asymmetry, there is an idiosyncratic (i.e.
1In the case of the UK FITs scheme to support photovoltaic (PV) electricity, due to complexities in
the monitoring process and unexpected reduction in PV panels cost, installed plants overshot signicantly
with respect to forecasts, leading to the need for an early review of tari¤s (in November 2011). In other
countries, such as Italy, the signicant costs related to the FIT system have shown "...the inability of the
regulator to directly control how much new capacity investors install in a given year, and the consequent
inability to control costs." (OECD, 2013, p. 165). Similarly, in Germany, the costs related to FITs have
increased far above government expectations (OECD, 2012). Finally, focusing on the di¤usion impact of
the rst EU ETS phase in Italy, Borghesi et al. (2015) underline how specic sector-level features might
lead to counterintuitive (and unexpected) outcomes.
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rm-level) informational asymmetry about xed adoption costs. This is close to several
real-life policy problems where entire sectors are subject to regulation and are expected
to implement the same clean technology (e.g. renewable energy).
The comparison of incentives towards cleaner technology adoption has been the subject
of a substantial amount of literature, starting from the seminal papers by Downing and
White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989).2 This literature had the merit to bring
to scholarsattention the need to explicitly include technological change in instruments
comparisons. Requate and Unold (2001, 2003) build and comment upon earlier papers on
the relative merits of di¤erent environmental policy instruments in terms of technology
adoption. Through the lens of general models featuring heterogeneous (Requate and
Unold, 2001) and homogeneous (Requate and Unold, 2003) rms, the authors compare
emission taxes or abatement subsidies and tradable emission permits endogenizing the
number of adopters of the new technology. They focus on two extreme cases: one in
which the regulator sets the policy that was optimal without the new technology, and
another, which is the most relevant for our purposes, where the regulator knows about
the new technology. In the latter case, with commitment as well as with time consistency,
the regulator can implement the social optimum.
Even with perfect information, commitment and time consistency do not usually im-
plement the rst best if there are additional market failures (other than pollution). If the
number of rms is small, they can a¤ect environmental policy under time consistency,
which typically precludes attainment of the rst best. However, this does not mean that
commitment leads to higher welfare than time consistency. Amacher and Malik (2002)
demonstrate these ndings for emission taxation of a single rm choosing whether or not
to adopt a new abatement technology, so that technology adoption is a discrete variable.
Our model is more specic than Requate and Unolds settings in order to keep it man-
ageable with the added complexity of asymmetric information. In our setting, rms in
the industry are symmetric in terms of abatement costs, as in Requate and Unold (2003),
but asymmetric in terms of xed adoption costs. We will see that with asymmetric in-
formation, the regulator can implement the rst best under time consistency, but not
2This literature has since been surveyed by Ja¤e et al. (2003) and Requate (2005a).
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under commitment. More specically, we show that under commitment both instruments
can lead to over- or underinvestment ex post, depending on the realization of the cost
parameter. Asymmetric information, coupled with the assumption that the regulator sets
the policy taking into account the knowledge she has of the distribution of cost parame-
ters, implies therefore that the clear cut link between taxes (permits) and over (under)
investment obtained in Requate and Unold (2001, 2003) does not hold. However, under-
investment with permits is conrmed in expected terms. Finally, again like Requate and
Unold (2001, 2003) we nd that the regulator can implement the welfare optimum under
time consistency. This is because the regulator can perfectly infer the cost realization of
the new technology.
Weitzman (1974) was the rst to systematically address the relative performance of
price and quantity regulation under uncertainty in environmental policy or indeed any
area of policy. Whereas Weitzman (1974) concentrates mainly on uncertainty about
the intercept of the industrys Aggregate Marginal Abatement Cost (AMAC) curve, we
consider uncertainty about its slope.
As in Weitzman (1974), we nd that the comparison of price and quantity instruments
depends on the (average) slopes of the AMAC and Marginal Environmental Damage
curves. However, in our paper the average slope of the AMAC curve is determined by a
counterintuitive rule of reverse probability weighting: the steep slope is weighted by the
probability that the slope is at and vice versa.
Recent papers in the Weitzman (1974) vein include Mandell (2008), who considers reg-
ulating part of the polluters by tradable permits and the other part by emission taxation.
Krysiak and Oberauner (2011) let the rms choose between the two instruments. Stran-
lund (2014) compares an emission tax to a hybrid tradable permit scheme with a price
oor and a price ceiling (as introduced by Roberts and Spence, 1976) when uncertainty
about abatement costs and environmental damage is correlated (as analyzed by Stavins,
1996) and nds that when the correlation is negative, taxes can still be preferable to
the hybrid instrument. Ambec and Coria (2013) compare price and quantity instruments
for the control of two pollutants with asymmetric information about their interdependent
abatement costs. Yates (2012) deviates from the usual comparison of constant permit sup-
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ply with a constant tax rate, showing that the optimal permit supply function is better
at dealing with abatement cost uncertainty than the optimal pollution tax function.
Combining asymmetric information and innovation, Mendelsohn (1984), Krysiak (2008)
and Storrøsten (2014) examine how endogenous technical change a¤ects the choice be-
tween price and quantity instruments under commitment. In all three papers, technology
choice is continuous: A rm can invest to reduce the intercept and (in Krysiak (2008)
and Storrøsten (2014)) the slope of its MAC curve. Mendelsohn (1984) considers a sin-
gle rm, with asymmetric information about marginal abatement costs and investment
costs. Krysiak (2008) considers an industry with many ex-ante identical small rms who
discover their marginal abatement costs after they have made their investment decision.
Storrøsten (2014) adds product demand uncertainty to Krysiaks (2008) model. All three
papers nd (as we do in our model) that endogenous technical change reduces the slope
of the long-run MAC curve, making quantity regulation more attractive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set out the model in Section 2. In
Section 3 we derive the social optimum (or rst best) for the full-information benchmark.
Section 4 discusses how the rms make their emission and technology adoption decisions.
In Section 5 (6) we analyze the regulators behaviour and we derive the subgame perfect
equilibria under commitment (time consistency). In both Sections we rst determine
the full-information equilibrium as a benchmark, conrming Requate and Unolds (2001)
nding that this implements the rst best. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
There is a continuum of rms with mass 1, currently using abatement technology 1. A
rms total and marginal abatement costs with the current technology are:
C1(e1) =
1
2
(1  e1)2 ; MAC1(e1) = 1  e1 (1)
with e1 the emission level. Note that with the current technology, there are no xed costs
and all rms have the same cost function. Note also that, as is standard, the cost function
is decreasing and convex in emissions.
The rms must choose whether or not to invest in a cleaner technology. Firm is
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variable abatement cost with the new technology is:3
V Ci(e) =
1
2
(   e)2 (2)
with e the emission level. Two sources of asymmetric information are present in our
model: on variable costs and on xed costs. First of all, asymmetric information is
assumed concerning the cost parameter , which is known by the rms but not by the
regulator; the latter has an a priori distributon on  according to which it takes the value
L with probability v; and the value H with probability 1   v; where 1
2
< L < H < 1:
Note that the cost parameter is the same for all rms, i.e.  is an aggregate asymmetric
information parameter, linked to factors such as the speed at which the cost of the new
technology falls over time, or di¢ culties by rms to get the needed nancial resources.
The assumption L > 1
2
is intended to limit our attention to the more plausible case of
incremental innovation, and not of technologies that drastically reduce abatement costs.4
Adoption also implies xed cost F i of switching from the current to the new technol-
ogy. Each rm i knows its own F i: The regulator knows that xed cost F i is uniformly
distributed between 0 and F; but she does not know the xed cost of any individual
rm. As a result, xed cost F i is a source of idiosyncratic (i.e. rm-specic) asymmetric
information.
From (2), rm is total and marginal abatement costs with the new technology are:
Ci(e) = V C
i
(e) + F
i =
1
2
(   e)2 + F i; MAC(e) =    e (3)
Total emissions E are:
E = e + (1  )e1 (4)
with  the share of rms adopting the new technology. Total and marginal environmental
damage is, respectively:
D(E) =
1
2
dE2; MD(E) = dE (5)
with d > 0:
3For simplicity, we ignore the possibility that technological change reduces MAC for low levels of
abatement, but increases it for high levels (Amir et al., 2008; Bauman et al., 2008; Brechet and Jouvet,
2008). Perino and Requate (2012) explore the implications in a model with perfect information.
4The consequence of dramatic technological change (i.e.  < 12 ) is left for further research.
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In order to rule out corner solutions where  = 1 and/or e = 0; we shall assume:5
F > L(1  L) (6)
L >
dF
d [F + (1 H)2] + F (7)
H >
d
d+ 1
(8)
Note that (6) together with L > H > 1
2
implies:
F > (1  )2 (9)
We analyze two environmental policy instruments in two policy regimes. The two
environmental policy instruments are emission taxation and auctioned tradable emission
permits. Until recently, tradable permit schemes were mostly based on grandfather-
ing. Currently there is a movement toward auctioning of permits, especially in Phase 3
(2013-2020) of the EU Emissions Trading System, the largest tradable permit scheme in
existence. We will assume that the tradable permits are fully auctioned. This makes for
the clearest comparison with emission taxation. With both instruments, the rms have to
pay the government for all their emissions. More importantly, with either instrument the
regulator can only set the value of a single variable (the tax rate or the total amount of
permits). In the Conclusion, we will discuss how grandfathering of permits would a¤ect
our results.
The two policy regimes we consider are commitment and time consistency, the di¤er-
ence between them occurring in stages one and two of the game between the regulator
and the industry. In stage zero of each game, nature draws the cost realization  and each
rm is xed cost F i: As already mentioned, these costs are revealed to the rms, but not
to the regulator. All other parameters are common knowledge.
Under commitment, the regulator sets the total amount of emission permits or the
emission tax rate in stage one.6 In stage two, the rms choose a technology. This order
5In Appendix B we show that these conditions are necessary and su¢ cient to ensure interior solutions.
6In line with the literature, we assume that for the time horizon of our model under commitment,
the regulator cannot adjust environmental policy after inferring the cost realization  from the rms
behaviour. This does not imply that the regulator can never learn  or she can never adjust policy. Our
point is rather that learning  and adjusting policy takes time. Our model is only valid for the period
until the regulator can adjust her policy. See Costello and Karp (2004) for a model of learning when
regulating a single non-strategic rm with emission taxation or an emission quota.
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is reversed under time consistency. Finally, in stage three the rms choose their emission
level.
3 Full-information social optimum
In this section we derive the social optimum for the case where the regulator knows the
realization of  and each rm is xed cost F i in (3). Figure 1 illustrates the outcome for
d = 1:2;  = 0:6; F = 0:32:
Given ; the regulator sets the share  of investing rms and emissions e (e1) by
rms with the new (current) technology. It is easily seen that the regulator would like for
each rm with the same technology to emit the same amount, and for the rms with the
lowest xed costs to invest in the new technology. Social costs are:
SC = (1  )1
2
(1  e1)2 +  1
2
(   e)2 + 1
2
2F +
1
2
d [e + (1  )e1]2 (10)
The rst term on the RHS is total abatement cost for the rms with the current
technology, from (1). The second (third) term is total variable (xed) cost for the rms
with the new technology, by (3). There are  rms investing in the new technology, with
costs uniformly distributed between 0 and F; so that average cost is 12F and total
xed cost is 1
2
2F: Lastly, the fourth term is environmental damage, from (4) and (5).
Minimizing (10) with respect to e1 and e yields:
  1  e1 =    e = dE (11)
This is the standard condition that marginal abatement costs of all rms should be
equal to each other and to marginal environmental damage. We denote the level at which
MACs are equalized by  ; which may be interpreted as the shadow cost of emissions.
In Figure 1, the curves MAC1 and MAC show the marginal abatement costs for
the current and the new technology, respectively. Interpreted as functions of e1 and e;
they show a single rms MAC with the current and the new technology respectively.
Interpreted as functions of E, they show the industrys MAC if all rms used the same
technology. In Figure 1, whenMAC equals  0; for instance, a rm with the new (current)
technology emits e0 (e
0
1) in the social optimum according to (11).
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7In Appendix B we verify that  < ; so that e > 0 in the social optimum.
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Figure 1: Full-information social optimum with d = 1:2;  = 0:6; F = 0:32:
Minimizing (10) with respect to  yields:
1
2
(   e)2   1
2
(1  e1)2 + F = (e1   e)dE (12)
This is the equivalent of equation (7) in Requate and Unold (2001, p. 544). It says
that for the marginal rm that adopts the new technology (the adopting rm with the
highest xed cost F i), its increase in abatement costs (the LHS of (12)) should equal the
decrease in environmental damage that it causes (the RHS of (12)).
By (11), the rst two terms on the LHS of (12) cancel out and:
F = (e1   e) = (1  ) (13)
Figure 1 illustrates equation (13) for the optimal share of adopting rms. With the
shadow cost of emissions equal to  0; a rm that switches to the new technology reduces
environmental cost by the area BB1J1J which is equal to  0(e01   e0) =  0(1  ). This
means that it is socially optimal for all rms with xed cost of less than  0(1   ) to
switch to the new technology. The switching rm with the highest xed cost thus has
xed cost 0F exactly equal to area BB1J1J in Figure 1. Note that the area BB1J1
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equals 1
2
 00(1   ); which by (13) equals aggregate xed costs 12 (0)2 F of switching to
the new technology.
Substituting (11) and (13) into (4), aggregate emissions at  are:
E = e1   (1  ) = e1   (1  )
2
F
(14)
From (11), (13) and (14), we can dene the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve:
1  e1 = c(1  E)  AMAC (15)
where c is the negative of the slope of the AMAC curve with:8
c =
F
F + (1  )2 > ; cL < cH (16)
The AMAC function gives the industrys aggregate marginal abatement costs for a
given level of E; with e1; e and  set optimally according to (11) and (13). AMAC
is a weighted average of MAC and MAC1: The higher is ; the closer AMAC is to
MAC:
We can now solve (11) and (15) for the optimal level of total emissions and the corre-
sponding level of marginal damages and aggregate marginal abatement costs:
E =
c
c + d
;   =
cd
c + d
(17)
Substituting from (17) into (13) yields the optimal fraction of adopting rms:
 =
(1  )
F
cd
c + d
=
d (1  )
F (d+ 1) + d (1  )2 <
d
d+ 
< 1 (18)
The rst inequality follows from (6) and the fact that  is decreasing in F:
Note that L > 

H since by (9) and (18):
@
@
=
d

d (1  )2   F (d+ 1)
F (d+ 1) + d (   1)22 < 0
Aggregate total abatement costs ATAC for a given level of E with e1; e and  set
optimally according to (11) and (13) follow from integrating AMAC in (15) with respect
to E and noting that aggregate xed costs are zero for E = 1:
ATAC =
1
2
c(1  E)2 (19)
8The inequality c >  follows from (6). Like Mendelsohn (1984) and Krysiak (2008), we nd in our
model that endogenous technical change reduces the slope of the AMAC curve (c < 1):
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Figure 1 shows the optimal emission levels e; e

1 and E

 ; as well as the optimal level
  of marginal abatement costs. Given that the optimal share 

 of rms have switched
to the new technology, the industrys marginal abatement costs (net of xed costs) are
MAC : Aggregate variable abatement costs in the optimum are then given by the area
EKJ
 below the MAC curve. Following our discussion above for  0; aggregate xed
costs are KK1J1: This area is equal to JKJ1: Thus, aggregate total abatement costs
ATAC in the social optimum, consisting of xed plus variable abatement costs, are
JKJ1 + EKJ
 = EKJ1; the area below the AMAC curve.
Minimized social costs are:
SC = ATAC(E

 ) +D(E

 ) =
1
2
c(1  E )2 +
1
2
dE2 =
cd
2 (c + d)
(20)
The second equality follows from (5) and (19). The third equality follows from (17).
In Figure 1, aggregate total abatement costs are EKJ1 and total environmental damage
is OKE ; so that total social cost in the optimum is OKJ1.
4 Firmschoices
After deriving our rst best benchmark, we now turn to the regulated rms choices
concerning emission levels (subsection 4.1) and technology adoption (subsection 4.2) under
emission taxes and tradable permits. The rms know the cost realization  and take
environmental policy as well as the share of adopting rms () as given. Let x denote the
tax rate t under emission taxation and the permit price p under tradable permits.
4.1 Emissions
In stage 3 of the commitment as well as of the time consistency regime, each rm chooses
its emission level, having already made its technology choice. A rm minimizes the sum
of tax payment (under emission taxation) or permit purchases (under auctioned permits)
and variable abatement costs. Under emission taxation, each rm takes the tax rate as
given, because it has already been set by the regulator. Under tradable permits, each
rm takes the permit price as given, because the permit market is perfectly competitive
since there is a continuum of rms.
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A rm with the current technology minimizes C(e1) + xe1; so that by (1) it sets:
e1 = 1  x (21)
A rm with the new technology minimizes V Ci(e) + xe, so that by (2) it sets:
e =    x (22)
Substituting (21) and (22) into (4), the relation between E and x for given  and  is:
x = 1  E   (1  ) (23)
4.2 Technology choice
Technology choice is stage 2 under commitment and stage 1 under time consistency. In
both policy regimes and with both instruments, each rm takes x (the tax rate or the
permit price) as given. With commitment to emission taxation, the tax rate has been set
in stage 1. With time-consistent taxation, the rms realize that the tax rate (to be set in
stage 2) depends on the adoption rate ; but each rm considers itself too small to a¤ect
: Under tradable permits, the rms realize that the stage-3 permit price depends on ;9
but again each rm considers itself too small to a¤ect :
In the technology choice stage, each rm thus compares its overall costs (including tax
payment or permit purchase) with and without adoption of the new technology, taking x
as given. Overall costs of each rm without adopting are, from (1) and (21):
K1 =
1
2
(1  e1)2 + xe1 = x (2  x)
2
(24)
while rm is overall costs with the new technology are, from (3) and (22):
Ki =
1
2
(   e)2 + xe + F i = x (2   x)
2
+ F i (25)
With new technology cost realization ; rm i adopts if Ki < K1 or, by (24) and (25):
F i < F  x (1  ) (26)
9The permit price depends directly on  through the permit market, according to (23). With time
consistency,  also a¤ects the permit price indirectly through its e¤ect on the emission level E that the
regulator chooses in stage two.
12
As a consequence, the proportion of rms investing will be given by the proportion of
rms featuring F i < F: Since xed costs are uniformly distributed between 0 and F; the
share of adopting rms is, from (21) and (26):
 =
F
F
=
x(1  )
F
(27)
Note that (27) is the same as (13) with x =  , and (21) and (22) imply the rst
equality of (11). Thus we can use AMAC as dened in (15) and ATAC from (19) for
the policy scenarios as well. The reason is that rms make the socially optimal investment
decision, given x.
Total emissions for a given level of x follow from setting AMAC equal to x in (15):
E =
c   x
c
(28)
With tradable permits, we solve (27) and (28) simultaneously to nd the equilibrium
values of technology adoption  and permit price p given E and :10
p(E) = c(1  E); (E) = c
F
(1  )(1  E) = (1  )(1  E)
F + (1  )2 (29)
5 Commitment
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium for commitment. In stage one
of the commitment game, the regulator sets the emission tax rate or the total amount of
permits to be auctioned. In stage two, rms make their technology choices, as analyzed
in subsection 4.2. In stage three, rms decide on their emission level and (under tradable
permits) permit purchases, as analyzed in subsection 4.1.
In subsection 5.1, we rst establish the full-information benchmark. We analyze emis-
sion taxation (tradable permits) under asymmetric information in subsection 5.2 (5.3).
Finally, we compare the instruments with each other in subsection 5.4.
5.1 Full-information benchmark
If the regulator knows the cost realization ; she can implement the full-information social
optimum with tradable permits as well as with emission taxation. With tradable permits,
10The nal equality follows from (16).
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the regulator will set the number of permits at E given by (17). Substituting this into
(29) shows that the share of adopting rms in stage two will then be the optimal amount
 given by (18). With emission taxation, the regulator would set the tax rate equal to 


given by (17). Substituting this into (27) shows that in stage two, the share of adopting
rms will be  as given by (18), and substituting it into (28) shows that in stage 3 total
emissions will be E given by (17).
We thus conrm Requate and Unolds (2001) nding that under perfect information,
commitment implements the rst best with tradable permits and emission taxation when
regulating pollution and technology adoption by a continuum of heterogeneous rms.
5.2 Asymmetric information, emission taxation
In stage 1, the regulator sets the tax rate t that minimizes expected social cost. For cost
realization ; social costs are, substituting (28) into (5) and (19) with x = t:
SC = D(E) + ATAC(E) =
d
2

c   t
c
2
+
t2
2c
(30)
Accounting for the probability that the rms are e¢ cient (ine¢ cient), given by v
(1  v); we can write expected social costs using (30) as:
SC (t) = v
"
d
2

cL   t
cL
2
+
t2
2cL
#
+ (1  v)
"
d
2

cH   t
cH
2
+
t2
2cH
#
The rst order condition for t requires:
(t  d)cHcLc^ + dt

(1  v)c2L + vc2H

= 0
with c^ dened as the reverse probability-weighted average of c:
c^  (1  v)cL + vcH (31)
Solving for the optimal tax rate yields:
tCO = 
dcHcLc^ (32)
with

  1
cHcLc^ + d [(1  v)c2L + vc2H ]
(33)
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Substituting (32) into (27), the share of adopting rms under cost realization  is then:
(t
CO) =
(1  )
F

dcHcLc^ (34)
We dene excess social costs XSC as the social costs in excess of the minimized
full-information social costs given by SC in (20) for a given : From (30) and (32):
XSC(t
CO) =
d
2

c   tCO
c
2
+
 
tCO
2
2c
  cd
2 (c + d)
=
=

2d4 [(cL   c) vc2H + (cH   c)(1  v)c2L)]2
2c2(d+ c)
Expected excess social costs XSC are then, under taxation:
XSC(tCO) = vXSCL + (1  v)XSCH = 
d
4V ar(c)
2 (d+ cH) (d+ cL)
(35)
with the variance of c given by:
V ar(c) = v(1  v)(cH   cL)2 (36)
5.3 Asymmetric information, Tradable Permits
Expected social costs with tradable permits are, from (5), (19) and (29):
SC(E) =
1
2
dE2 +
1
2
vcL(1  E)2 + 1
2
(1  v)cH(1  E)2 (37)
The rst order condition with respect to E is:
(d+ c)E = c
with the expected value of c given by:
c = vcL + (1  v)cH (38)
Solving for E yields:
ECO =
c
d+ c
(39)
Substituting (39) into (29), we nd the equilibrium permit price p and adoption share
 for cost realization :
p(E
CO) =
dc
d+ c
; (E
CO) =
cd(1  )
F (d+ c)
(40)
15
Following the same reasoning as in the case of taxation, we substitute from (39) into
(37) and subtract expected rst best social costs obtained from (20) to calculate expected
excess social costs under emissions trading and commitment:
XSC(ECO) = SC(ECO)  vcLd
2 (cL + d)
  (1  v)cHd
2 (cH + d)
=
d2V ar(c)
2 (d+ cH) (d+ cL) (d+ c)
(41)
5.4 Comparison
In this section we compare emission permits and emission taxes under commitment, both
with rst best levels and with each other, in terms of welfare and technology adoption.
5.4.1 Technology adoption
Let us rst analyze ex post technology adoption, i.e. for a given realization of .11
Proposition 1 Under commitment, taxation (emissions trading) leads ex post to over(under)
investment for a favourable cost realization, and to under(over) investment for an un-
favourable cost realization.
Intuitively, under emission taxation, the second best tax rate must be between the
ex post optimal level for  = L and the ex post optimal level for  = H: Then, as the
share of adopting rms is increasing in the tax rate for a given rmstype, we can easily
conclude that ex post overinvestment (underinvestment) takes place when  = L (when
 = H): With tradable permits, it is straightforward to show from (17) and (39) that
the total amount of permits must be between the ex post optimal amount for  = L and
the ex post optimal amount for  = H: This clearly implies that the second best permits
price is lower (higher) than in the social optimum when  = L (when  = H). Since, for
a given rmstype, the share of adopting rms is increasing in the permit price by (27),
then tradable permits lead to ex post underinvestment when  = L and overinvestment
when  = H; the opposite of what happens under emission taxation.
Let us now turn to the ex ante expected share of adopters .
Proposition 2 Expected adoption with tradable permits under commitment is lower than
under rst best:
11See Appendix A for the proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 5.
16
1MD
AMACH
EO
AMACL
E*L E*HE
~
B
G
J
Figure 2: Expected new technology adoption under tradable permits (commitment)
Figure 2 illustrates the intuition behind Proposition 2 for v = 1
2
: Dene E() as the
emission level that would lead to rst best expected adoption  = vL + (1   v)H ;
and ~E as the probability-weighted average of the full-information optimal emission levels.
Under v = 1
2
; ~E is halfway between the rst best levels EL and E

H : Thus the increase in
emissions from EL to ~E for  = L is the same as the decrease in emissions from E

H to
~E for  = H: However, this change decreases technology adoption more for  = L than
it increases it for  = H; because rms are more sensitive to a change in total allowed
emissions when the cost of the new technology is low, since by (29):12
@L
@E
  @H
@E
=
(1 H)cH   (1  L)cL
F
< 0
As a result, E() < ~E: It can also be shown that ECO > ~E: At ~E; the marginal social
cost related to emissions increase from EL to ~E under type L; i.e. distance BJ in Figure
2; is smaller than the marginal social cost of reducing emissions from EH to ~E under type
12We prove this inequality in Appendix A.2:
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H; distance GB:13 As optimality requires that the two marginal social costs be equal to
each other, then ~E is too low to be optimal and thus ECO > ~E: This in turn implies that
E() < ECO; so that, as adoption is decreasing in the aggregate cap, expected adoption
under tradable permits is smaller than rst best. The intuition is as follows. Because
AMACH is steeper than AMACL, the regulator is more worried about emissions turning
out too low in hindsight when  = H than about emissions turning out too high when
 = L. As a result, the regulator sets allowed emissions relatively closer to EH rather
than EL; and expected adoption will be lower than in the optimum.
Turning to ex ante expected adoption under taxation, we get a less straightforward
result. Expected adoption under taxation is more likely to be higher than optimal (and
than expected adoption under tradable permits) when the xed cost of adoption is high,
technology improvement is relatively insignicant, and the damage parameter is small.14
The intuition is that all these factors make the AMAC curves, and especially the AMACH
curve, relatively steep compared to theMD curve. This means that the regulator is more
worried about the welfare loss from underinvestment for  = H than about overinvestment
for  = L: As a result, she will set a relatively higher tax rate, closer to  H and further from
 L. This higher tax rate results in higher than optimal expected adoption. Clearly, when
expected adoption exceeds rst best, it also exceeds expected adoption under tradable
permits, as the latter always falls short of rst best expected adoption from Proposition
2.
5.4.2 Welfare
Comparing excess social costs between instruments yields, from (35) and (41):
  XSC(tCO) XSC(ECO) = 
d
2V ar (c)
2 (d+ c)
[d  c^] (42)
13The proof is as follows. Distance GB equals AMACH( ~E)   MD( ~E); while distance BJ equals
MD( ~E) AMACL( ~E): From (5) and (15), with v = 12 , we nd that GB is larger than BJ because:
AMACH( ~E) +AMACL( ~E)  2MD( ~E) = d (cH   cL)
2
2 (d+ cH) (d+ cL)
> 0
14The formal proof is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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where c is the expected value of the slope of the AMAC curve given by (38) and V ar(c)
is the corresponding variance, given by (36). Crucially, c^ as dened in (31) is the average
slope of the AMAC curve, featuring reverse probability weights: the slope of the AMAC
curve when  = L is weighted with the probability that  = H; and vice versa. This leads
us to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under commitment, taxation is preferred to tradable permits if and only
if the slope d of the Marginal Damage (MD) curve is smaller than the weighted average
of the slopes of the Marginal Abatement Cost curves AMACL and AMACH in (15), with
reverse probability weights.
Equation (42) is reminiscent of Weitzman (1974) in that taxation is preferred if and
only if the weighted average slope of the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve is larger
than the slope of the Marginal Damage (MD) curve. However, as we have seen, the proba-
bility weighting is reversed in determining the average slope c^. This is a new result in the
"prices vs. quantities" literature which, following Weitzman (1974), has mainly concen-
trated on additive uncertainty (i.e. about the intercept of the MAC curve). In our setting,
the cost parameter enters the individual rms marginal abatement cost function in an
additive way in (3). However, when we take endogenous technology choice into account,
the cost parameter alters the slope of the industrys aggregate marginal abatement cost
curve by (15) and (16). There is thus multiplicative uncertainty about the AMAC curve
(i.e. uncertainty about its slope). Weitzman (1974, p. 486; 1978) and Malcomson (1978)
derive expressions for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities under multi-
plicative uncertainty. However, the role of reverse probability weighting is not apparent
from these expressions nor is it discussed by the authors.15
We can explain the reverse probability weighting with the aid of Figure 3. Suppose
the regulator is practically certain that the cost realization is H: She would then issue
EH permits and set the tax rate at 

H ; both given by (17): If, against all expectations,
the cost realization is L; the welfare loss is RSN with emission permits and ZRJ with
15Watson and Ridker (1984) and Hoel and Karp (2001) also analyze multiplicative uncertainty. How-
ever, they do not o¤er explicit expressions for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities, focusing
instead on simulations (Watson and Ridker (1984) on several pollutants in the US and Hoel and Karp
(2001) on climate change).
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Figure 3: The reverse Weitzman rule
taxation. The welfare loss is larger with taxes, because AMACL is atter thanMD: This
result is similar to Weitzman (1974), however the new element is that it is the slope of the
AMAC curve in the unlikely scenario (that the cost realization is L in this example) that
is relevant for the comparison between tradable permits and taxes.16 In general, the slope
of the AMAC curve in the less likely scenario receives the larger weight. This explains
the reverse probability weighting of the AMAC slopes in (42).
6 Time Consistency
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium for time consistency. In stage
one of the time consistency game, rms choose whether to invest in the new technology, as
analyzed in subsection 4.2. In stage two, having observed the proportion of investing rms,
the regulator sets the emission tax rate or the total amount of permits to be auctioned.
16If the regulator is practically certain that the cost realization is L; she would issue EL permits and
set the tax rate at L, both given by (17). If the cost realization is H; the welfare loss is BSR with
tradable permits and SGK with taxation. The welfare loss is larger with permits, because AMACH is
steeper than MD:
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In stage three, rms decide on their emission level and (under tradable permits) permit
purchases, as analyzed in subsection 4.1.
In subsection 6.1, we rst establish the full-information benchmark. We analyze emis-
sion taxation (tradable permits) under asymmetric information in subsection 6.2 (6.3).
6.1 Full information benchmark
In this subsection we establish the subgame perfect equilibrium under time consistency,
given that the regulator knows the cost realization : In stage two of the game, the
regulator knows the proportion  of rms that have invested in the new technology in stage
one, and she knows that in stage three the rms will set their emissions according to (21)
and (22). The regulator minimizes the sum of variable abatement cost and environmental
damage which, from (1), (3), (21) and (22) is:
SCTC = (1  )
1
2
(1  e1)2 + 1
2
(   e)2 + 1
2
dE2 =
1
2
x2 +
1
2
dE2 (43)
With emission taxation, substituting (23) into (43) yields:
SCTC (t) =
1
2
t2 +
1
2
d [1  t   (1  )]2 (44)
Solving the rst order condition for t yields:
tTC =
d [1  (1  )]
d+ 1
(45)
In stage one, the share of adopting rms as a function of x = tTC is given by (27).
Solving (27) and (45) for  and t; we nd the full-information rst best values of 
from (18) and   from (17), respectively.
With auctioned permits, substituting (23) into (43) yields:
SCTC (E) =
1
2
[1  E   (1  )]2 + 1
2
dE2 (46)
Solving the rst order condition for E yields:
ETC =
1   (1  )
d+ 1
(47)
In stage one, the share of adopting rms is given by (29). Solving (29) and (47) for 
and E; we nd the full-information rst best values of  from (18) and E

 from (17).
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We thus conrm Requate and Unolds (2001) nding that under perfect information,
time consistency implements the rst best with tradable permits and emission taxation
when regulating pollution and technology adoption by a continuum of heterogeneous rms.
Now we turn to compare emission taxation and emission permits under time consistency
and asymmetric information.
6.2 Asymmetric information, emission taxation
In this subsection we establish the subgame perfect equilibrium under emission taxation,
given that the regulator does not know the cost realization : In stage two of the game,
the regulator knows the proportion  of rms that have invested in the new technology
in stage one. Having observed ; the regulator updates her beliefs on the cost realization.
Let us denote the regulators stage-2 probability that  = L by q: The regulator also knows
that in stage three the rms will set their emissions according to (21) and (22) with x = t.
The regulator minimizes the sum of variable abatement cost and environmental damage
according to her updated beliefs:
SCTC(t) = qSCTCL (t) + (1  q)SCTCH (t)
where, analogous to (46):
SCTC (t) =
1
2
t2 +
1
2
d [1  t  (1  )]2
Solving the rst order condition for t yields:
tTC =
d
d+ 1
[1   (1  qL  (1  q)H)] (48)
We wish to specify beliefs in such a way that they generate the full-information rst
best as the unique solution given : Furthermore, q should be nondecreasing in  and
beliefs should be consistent. The latter condition means that in any candidate equilibrium,
q > 0 for  = L and q < 1 for  = H: A q() function that satises these conditions (for
emission taxation as well as for tradable permits) is:
q() =
8><>:
0 for  2 [0; H ]
L( H)
(L H) for  2 (

H ; 

L)
1 for  2 [L; 1]
(49)
22
ppH L*O
p
q
*
1
1
0.5
0.5
Figure 4: The regulators beliefs q depending on the proportion  of investing rms for
H = 0:8; L = 0:6; F = 0:32:
Figure 4 illustrates the q() function for H = 0:8; L = 0:6; F = 0:32; so that by (18),
H =
5
13
and L =
5
8
.
Substituting (49) into (48) yields:
tTC =
8<:
tTCH for  2 [0; H ]
tTCq for  2 (H ; L)
tTCL for  2 [L; 1]
(50)
with tTC given by (45) and:
tTCq =
d [(1   [1 H]) (L   H)  (H   L)L(   H)]
(d+ 1) (L   H)
We see that tTC is a continuous, decreasing and piecewise linear function of : Figure
5 illustrates the outcome for d = 2; H = 0:8; L = 0:6; F = 0:32:
Moving to stage one, we know from subsection 4.2 that the share of adopting rms as
a function of x = t is given by (27) with:
@(t)
@t
=
1  
F
> 0;
@(t)
@
=   t
F
< 0 (51)
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Figure 5: Time consistency, taxation with d = 2; H = 0:8; L = 0:6; F = 0:32
Figure 5 shows L and H in (; t) space for the specic parameter values. By (51),
 is increasing in t and the H curve is to the left (and above) the L curve.
Solving (27) and (45) for  and tTC ; we nd that the full-information rst best
combination of (; 

) from (18) and (17) respectively, is a solution. Indeed, as illustrated
in Figure 5, this is the unique solution because  is increasing in t and tTC is continuous
and decreasing in . We can therefore conclude the following:
Proposition 4 In the subgame-perfect equilibrium under time-consistent emissions taxa-
tion, and under regulators beliefs as specied in (49), the regulator correctly infers the cost
realization from observing the share of adopting rms. As a result, the full-information
rst best is the only equilibrium.
6.3 Asymmetric information, tradable emission permits
In this subsection we establish the subgame perfect equilibrium under tradable permits,
given that the regulator does not know the cost realization : In stage two of the game,
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the regulator knows the proportion  of rms that have invested in the new technology
in stage one. Having observed ; the regulator updates her beliefs on the cost realization.
As with emission taxation, we assume that q; the regulators stage-2 probability that
 = L; is given by (49): The regulator also knows that in stage three the rms will set
their emissions according to (21) and (22) with x = p. The regulator minimizes the sum
of variable abatement cost and environmental damage according to her updated beliefs:
SCTC(E) = qSCTCL (E) + (1  q)SCTCH (E)
where, analogous to (46):
SCTC (E) =
1
2
[1  E   (1  )]2 + 1
2
dE2
The rst order condition is:
q [1  E   (1  L)] + (1  q) [1  E   (1 H)] = dE
Solving for E yields:
E =
1   [1  qL  (1  q)H]
1 + d
(52)
Substituting (49) into (52), ETC becomes:
ETC =
8<:
ETCH for  2 [0; H ]
ETCq for  2 (H ; L)
ETCL for  2 [L; 1]
(53)
with ETC given by (47) and:
ETCq =
(1   [1 H]) (L   H)  (H   L)L(   H)
(d+ 1) (L   H)
(54)
Note that ETC is a continuous, piecewise linear and decreasing function of : Figure
6 illustrates ETC for the same parameter values as used in Figure 5.
Moving on to stage one, we know from subsection 4.2 that the share of adopting rms
is given by (29) with:
@(E)
@E
=   1  
F + (1  )2 < 0;
@(E)
d
=
[(1  )2   F ] (1  E)
[F + (1  )2]2 < 0 (55)
The second inequality follows from (9). Figure 6 shows the L and H curves in (;E)
space for specic parameter values. Note that the L curve is to the right of the H curve
by @=@ < 0 in (55).
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Figure 6: Time consistency, auctioned permits with d = 2; H = 0:8; L = 0:6; F = 0:32
It is easily seen that (; E

 ) is a solution to (29) and (52) for cost realization . The
following proposition shows that this is the unique solution, as Figure 6 illustrates for the
specic parameter values.
Proposition 5 Under time consistency and tradable permits, and under regulators be-
liefs as specied in (49), the regulator correctly infers the cost realization from observing
the share of adopting rms. As a result, the full-information rst best is the unique equi-
librium.
7 Conclusion
Asymmetric information is an important reason why regulators struggle to set appropriate
environmental policy. We have modelled the environmental regulation of an industry
consisting of a continuum of small rms, with asymmetric information about the (xed
and variable) cost of a new abatement technology. Under commitment (time consistency),
the regulator sets environmental policy before (after) the rms make their technology
adoption decision. With commitment, the regulator cannot implement the rst best
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(unlike with full information, as in Requate and Unold, 2001, 2003). Tradable permits
lead to higher welfare than emission taxation if and only if the slope of the marginal
damage curve is steeper than the probability-weighted slopes of the marginal abatement
cost curves. While this result is similar to the Weitzman (1974) rule, the probability
weighting is such that the slope of the high-cost curve is weighted by the probability that
cost is low, and vice versa. We further found that time consistency allows the regulator
to infer the cost of the new technology. The outcome is thus the same as under full
information. We know from Requate and Unold (2001) that the rst best is implemented
in this case.
Since time consistency leads to a better outcome than commitment, one may wonder
why we need to analyze commitment in any detail. Why doesnt the regulator follow
the time-consistent route of setting policy after the rms have made their investment
decisions and uncertainty has been resolved? One reason may be that policy can only be
set at certain xed intervals. A regulator may not always have the opportunity to wait
until uncertainty has been resolved, especially if there are several sources of uncertainty,
emerging and resolving themselves at di¤erent points in time. Moreover, a regulator may
not be able to respond swiftly once uncertainty has been resolved.
Similarly, one may wonder why the regulator can only commit to a single tax rate
or amount of tradable permits. If the regulator could commit to a policy menu, with
the tax rate or amount of permits dependent on the rmsadoption decisions, she would
be able to implement the rst best. For instance, the regulator could commit to the
time-consistent policy. One di¢ culty with this is that, again, the regulator would need
to be able to swiftly implement the policy once the relevant information is available. In
addition, this kind of policy menu may be di¢ cult to design, to explain
and to agree upon. Finally, the di¤erent situations (here: the adoption rate of the new
technology) that determine the policy to be implemented must be dened on the basis of
veriable information. It is perhaps for these reasons that such policy menus are hardly
observed in practice.
We therefore consider our time consistency scenario to be a stylized benchmark, as
it is di¢ cult to imagine an immediate adjustment of environmental policies to adoption
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choices by regulated rms. The type of asymmetric information modelled in our paper
has therefore to be interpreted as one of the many possible bricks in a general comparison
among environmental policy tools under commitment and time consistency, suggesting
circumstances when, ceteris paribus, asymmetric information on abatement costs may
shift the balance in favour of time consistency.
We have assumed that rms are heterogeneous only in their cost of adopting the new
technology. This assumption is not, in itself, expected to a¤ect our main results.
We have used quadratic functional forms for the abatement cost and damage functions
in order to obtain denite results. This has allowed us to derive the modied Weitzman
rule with reverse probability weighting. This result, like the original Weitzman rule,
only holds if abatement cost and environmental damage are (or can be approximated by)
quadratic functions of emissions.
We anticipate that time consistency would also implement the full-information rst
best with more general functional forms. However, care must be taken to specify the
regulators beliefs such that this is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
The main reason why we found that time consistency implements the rst best is our
assumption that the industry consists of many small rms. This means that an individual
rm considers itself too small to a¤ect environmental policy. Our model is therefore most
applicable to the regulation of a large number of polluters, such as the EU Emission
Trading System or the now practically defunct Sulfur Allowance Trading programme in
the US (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). The small rms assumption is the main driving
force behind our conclusion that rms make the socially optimal adoption decision, for a
given tax rate or permits price, which in turn implies that the asymmetric information
about xed costs does not matter in equilibrium. As a result, the regulator, in facing
informational asymmetries, only has to infer a single parameter concerning regulated
rmscosts. If, on the other hand, the industry contained a few large rms, these rms
would generally not take the socially optimal adoption choice under any instrument or
policy timing; for example, they would be able to a¤ect time-consistent policy, so that
it would typically not implement the rst best anymore and might even be worse than
commitment (Amacher and Malik, 2002). However, when there are large rms in the
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industry, this also means that the tradable permit market is not perfectly competitive
anymore. Tradable permits would not lead to equalization of marginal abatement costs
across rms, thereby introducing another di¤erence between this instrument and emission
taxation. Needless to say, tradable permits might still be second best and better for welfare
than emission taxation, because of the other market failures and opportunities for rms
strategic behaviour.
We have assumed that the emission permits are auctioned to the rms. This makes for
the clearest comparison with emission taxation. With both instruments, the rms have
to pay the government for all their emissions. More importantly, with either instrument
the regulator can only set the value of a single variable (the tax rate or the total amount
of permits). Grandfathering instead of auctioning permits gives the regulator another
variable to set: the number of grandfathered permits. If the number of grandfathered
permits is xed, i.e. it does not change with the rms adoption decision or with the total
adoption rate, the outcome will be the same in terms of adoption rate and permit price
(as in Requate and Unold, 2001). Indeed, keeping the number of grandfathered permits
xed is the regulators best strategy. This is immediately clear for time consistency, where
auctioned permits already implement the full-information rst best, so that any deviation
can only reduce welfare.
With commitment, we have seen that auctioned tradable permits result in too little
expected adoption of the new technology. Thus it might seem that the regulator could
increase welfare by specifying the grandfathering rules in a way that stimulates adoption.
However, it should be borne in mind that given the total amount of permits issued, small
rms in our setting will make the socially optimal adoption decisions when the number
of grandfathered permits is xed. Varying the number of grandfathered permits will only
increase aggregate abatement costs (and thereby social costs) for a given level of permits.
It does not help the regulator with the main problem that she has to set the total amount
of permits before she knows (or can infer) the cost realization.
Finally, an interesting extension of this paper could be in the direction of more complex
informational structures. For example, less straightforward conclusions in the time consis-
tency case could be obtained assuming that the rms only learn their marginal abatement
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cost parameter after investing in the new technology, as, for example, in Krysiak (2008).
We leave this issue for future research.
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A Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1
Under emission taxation, from (17) and (32):
 L < t
CO <  H (A1)
As the share of adopting rms is increasing in  by (13) and in t by (27):
L(t
CO) > L; H(t
CO) < H
with  given by (18). Thus with taxation, there is ex post over-(under-)investment when
 = L (H):
With tradable permits, from (17) and (39):
EL < E
CO < EH
As total emissions are decreasing in the optimal AMAC by (15) and in p by (28), these
inequalities imply:
pL(E
CO) <  L; pH(E
CO) >  H (A2)
with   given by (17). Then, since the share of adopting rms is increasing in  by (13)
and in p by (27):
L(E
CO) < L; H(E
CO) > H
with  given by (18). Thus with tradable permits, there is ex post under-(over-)investment
when  = L (H):
A.2 Proposition 2
We rst compare the expected share of adopters under tradable permits to that with the
optimal policy for each cost realization. From (18):
 = vL + (1  v)H =
1
F

v (1  L) dcL
d+ cL
+ (1  v) (1 H) dcH
d+ cH

(A3)
Dene E() as the emission level (the same for both cost realizations) that would,
under tradable permits, lead to : From (29) and (A3):
E() =
(1  v)(1 H)c2H(cL + d) + v(1  L)c2L(cH + d)
(d+ cH) (d+ cL) [(1  v)(1 H)cH + v(1  L)cL] (A4)
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Let us now compare E() to ~E; dened as the probability-weighted average of the
full-information optimal emission levels given by (17):
~E  vEL + (1  v)EH = v
cL
d+ cL
+ (1  v) cH
d+ cH
(A5)
From (A4) and (A5):
E()  ~E =   dv(1  v) (cH   cL) E
(d+ cH) (d+ cL) (v(1  L)cL + (1  v)(1 H)cH) < 0 (A6)
The inequality follows from (16) and:
E  (1  L)cL   (1 H)cH > 0 (A7)
where E > 0 follows from applying (9) to:
@ [c (1  )]
@
=  F

F   (1  )2
(F + (1  )2)2 < 0
To conclude the proof, we need to compare ~E to ECO: From (39) and (A5):
ECO   ~E = dv(1  v) (cH   cL)
2
(d+ cH) (d+ cL) (d+ vcL + (1  v)cH) > 0 (A8)
Putting (A6) and (A8) together, we see that E() < ECO: Since  is decreasing in
E by (29), this means that expected adoption with tradable permits is lower than :
A.3 Proposition 5
We rst note that there is no solution where  2 (H ; L); because the only point of
intersection between the ETCq curve in (54) and the  curve in (29) (both being linear)
is (; E

 ):
Moreover, there is no candidate equilibrium where beliefs are inconsistent. There is
no solution where  = L and q = 0; because the unique solution TCLH to (29) with  = L
and (47) with  = H lies outside the range where q = 0:
TCLH 
d(1  L)
[F + (1  L)2] (1 + d)  (1 H)(1  L) >
d (1 H)
F (d+ 1) + d(1 H)2 = 

H
where the second equality follows from (18) and the inequality follows from:
TCLH   H =
	
[[F + (1  L)2] (1 + d)  (1 H)(1  L)] [F (d+ 1) + d(1 H)2] > 0
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where by (9):
	  d(1 + d)(H   L) [F   (1 H)(1  L)] > 0 (A9)
Neither is there a solution where  = H and q = 1; because the solution TCHL to (29)
with  = H and (47) with  = L lies outside the range where q = 1:
TCHL 
d(1 H)
[F + (1 H)2] (1 + d)  (1 H)(1  L) <
d (1  L)
F (d+ 1) + d(1  L)2 = 

L
The inequality follows from:
L   TCHL =
	
[[F + (1 H)2] (1 + d)  (1 H)(1  L)] [F (d+ 1) + d(1  L)2] > 0
with 	 > 0 given by (A9).
B Appendix B: Conditions for an interior solution
B.1 Positive emission levels by adopting rms
In this section we verify that all possible scenarios feature e > 0 for any probability v of
 = L: From (22) this implies that the optimal MAC; the tax rate and the permit price
must all be below :
B.1.1 Commitment and full-information social optimum
For  = L; it follows from (A1) and (A2) that:
pL(E
CO) <  L < t
CO (B1)
Thus we need to make sure that tCO < L: From (A1) we know that tCO <  H : As a
result:
tCO <  H =
dcH
d+ cH
< L (B2)
The nal inequality follows from (7) and (16).
For  = H; it follows from (A1) and (A2) that:
tCO <  H < pH(E
CO) (B3)
Thus we need to make sure that pH(ECO) < H: From (40) this implies:
pH(E
CO) =
dcH
d+ vcL + (1  v)cH <
dcH
d+ cL
= pH(E
CO)jv=1 < H (B4)
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The rst inequality follows from the fact that the LHS is increasing in v: Noting that
cH > H by (6) and (16); the second inequality can be rewritten as:
d <
HcL
cH  H (B5)
Condition (7) is a su¢ cient condition for (B5) to hold, because using (16), the former
can be rewritten as:
d <
LcH
cH   L
and:
LcH
cH   L <
HcL
cH  H ,
L
cL(cH   L) <
H
cH(cH  H)
where the second inequality holds because, from (16):
@


c(cH )

@
=
F

(1  2) (   1)2 + F + (1 H)2 22(1  )
cH [(1 H)2   F (1  )]2
> 0
The inequality follows from 1
2
< L    H < 1 and (6).
B.1.2 Time consistency
Under time consistency, e > 0 should hold in any subgame where the regulator be-
lieves there is a positive probability that  occurs. From (22) and (49), this means that
tTC ; pTCH < H for q < 1; i.e. for  2 [0; L) and tTC ; pTCL < L for q > 0; i.e. for
 2 (H ; 1]:
For taxation and q < 1, we nd from (50):
tTC()  tTC(0) = d
d+ 1
< H (B6)
The rst inequality follows from the fact that tTC is decreasing in : The second
inequality follows from (8).
For taxation and q > 0; so that  2 (H ; 1]; we nd from (17) and (50):
tTC()  tTC(H) =  H < L (B7)
The rst inequality follows from the fact that tTC is decreasing in : The second
inequality follows from (B2).
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For tradable permits and q < 1; note rst that for  2 [0; H ] where q = 0; we
have pH(ETCH ; ) = t
TC
H () < H by (23), (50), (53) and (B6). From (23) and (53), for
 2 (H ; L) and  = L;H; the total di¤erential of p(ETCq ; ) with respect to  is
constant and may be positive:
dp(E
TC
q ; )
d
=
@p(E
TC
q ; )
@ETCq
dETCq
d
+
@p(E
TC
q ; )
@
=
(1  L)L   (1 H)H
(1 + d)(L   H)
  (1  )
(B8)
We thus have to verify that pH(ETCq ; 

L) = pH(E

L; 

L) < H. From (29) and (B4) we
see that:
pH(E

L; 

L) < pH(E

L; H(E

L)) = pH(E
CO)jv=1 < H
The rst inequality follows from @pH=@ < 0 by (23) and H(EL) < L(E

L) = 

L by
(17), (29) and (55). The second inequality follows from (B4).
For tradable permits and q > 0; note rst that for  2 [L; 1] where q = 1; we have
pL(E
TC
L ; ) = t
TC
L () < L by (23), (50), (53) and (B7). We know from (B8) that for
 2 (H ; L); the total di¤erential of pL(ETCq ; ) with respect to  is constant and may
be negative: We thus have to verify that pL(ETCq ; 

H) = pL(E

H ; 

H) < L. From (17) and
(29) we see that:
pL(E

H ; 

H) < pH(E

H ; 

H) = 

H < L
The rst inequality follows from @p=@ > 0 in (23). The second inequality follows
from (B2).
B.2 Less than complete adoption
In this section we verify that  < 1 in all scenarios. We know from Section 6 that time
consistency implements the full-information social optimum. Thus we only need to check
that  < 1 in the full-information social optimum and with commitment.
From (27),  is increasing in x: Thus we need to make sure that  < 1 holds for the
highest possible x; which from (B3) and (B1) implies:
L(t
CO) < 1; H(E
CO) < 1 (B9)
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From (27), (51), (55), (B2) and (B4), we know that:
L(t
CO) < L(

H) =
dcH
d+ cH
1  L
F
(B10)
H(E
CO) < H(E

L) =
dcH
d+ cL
1 H
F
(B11)
From (B9) to (B11) we thus need to make sure that:
dcH
d+ cH
1  L
F
< 1 (B12)
dcH
d+ cL
1 H
F
< 1 (B13)
Inequality (B12) holds because:
dcH
d+ cH
1  L
F
<
L(1  L)
F
< 1
The rst inequality follows from (7) and (16). The second inequality follows from (6).
Since (B12) holds, (B13) also holds, because:
1  L
d+ cH
>
1 H
d+ cL
The inequality follows from applying (9) to:
d
d
f(1  ) (d+ c)g =  d  F [(F   (1  )
2]
(F + (1  )2)2 < 0
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